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1. Introduction
Many mathematical models, including optimization, multiobjective optimization, varia-
tional inequalities, fixed point and complementarity problems, Nash equilibria in nonco-
operative games and inverse optimization, can be formulated in the same format, namely
the equilibrium problem
find x∗ ∈ C s.t. f(x∗, y) ≥ 0, ∀ y ∈ C, (EP )
where C ⊆ Rn is a nonempty, closed and convex set and f : Rn×Rn → R is a bifunction
which satisfies f(x, x) = 0 for all x ∈ C (see, for instance, [7, 8]). This general format
clearly stems from variational inequalities, and solution methods for (EP ) generally
extend those originally designed for optimization or variational inequalities exploiting
the underlying common structure.
Algorithms for (EP ) can be roughly divided into a few classes (see the survey paper
[7]): fixed point, extragradient, convex feasibility and descent methods, which generally
require the solution of a sequence of (convex) optimization problems, and proximal point
and Tikhonov-Browder regularization methods, which generally require the solution of a
sequence of equilibrium problems with better properties than the given one. Almost all
these methods share a common feature: convergence is guaranteed under suitable mono-
tonicity assumptions on the bifunction f . This is not really surprising as the monotonicity
of the operator is a crucial assumption in the algorithms for variational inequalities (see
for instance [13]). Indeed, in equilibrium problems monotonicity plays a role which is
similar to convexity in optimization. For instance, stationarity points of gap and D-gap
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functions for (EP ) are actually global minima if appropriate monotonicity conditions
hold (see [3–5, 31, 47]).
Several definitions of monotonicity for bifunctions have been introduced. Anyway, to
the best of our knowledge, a thorough study of their relations has never been carried out.
Therefore, the paper aims at analysing all the relationships between those monotonicity
conditions which are relevant in the algorithms for (EP ). Twelve different conditions
have been identified and they are briefly recalled in Section 2, while Section 3 provides a
full picture of the relationships between them. Finally, the analysis is further detailed in
Section 4 for two particular cases: variational inequalities and the so-called linear equi-
librium problems, which include also Nash equilibrium problems with quadratic payoffs.
Since the convexity of f(x, ·) is required (for any x ∈ C) by all the algorithms for (EP )
and some require also that f is continuously differentiable, both assumptions are taken
for granted in the whole paper.
2. Monotonicity conditions
Monotonicity is a straightforward concept for real-valued functions of one single variable:
for instance, g : R→ R is monotone increasing on C ⊆ R if g(y) ≥ g(x) holds whenever
x, y ∈ C satisfy y > x. The statement
(g(y)− g(x))(y − x) ≥ 0, ∀ x, y ∈ C,
provides an elegant alternative definition, which can be easily extended to vector-valued
mappings.
Definition 2.1 F : Rn → Rn is called monotone on C ⊆ Rn if
〈F (y)− F (x), y − x〉 ≥ 0, ∀ x, y ∈ C, (1)
where 〈·, ·〉 denotes the Euclidean scalar product in Rn. Strict monotonicity means
that (1) holds replacing ≥ by > whenever y 6= x, while strong monotonicity requires
the existence of some τ > 0 such that the left-hand side of (1) is greater or equal to
τ‖y − x‖2.
When (EP ) is a variational inequality, i.e. f(x, y) = 〈F (x), y − x〉 for some operator
F : Rn → Rn, the left-hand side of (1) can be rewritten exploiting f :
〈F (y)− F (x), y − x〉 = −(f(x, y) + f(y, x)).
Therefore, monotonicity conditions for a bifunction f : Rn × Rn → R can be introduced
relying on this relationship.
Definition 2.2 f is called monotone on C if
f(x, y) + f(y, x) ≤ 0, ∀ x, y ∈ C, (2)
while it is called strictly monotone on C if (2) holds replacing ≤ by < whenever y 6= x.
f is called strongly monotone on C if there exists τ > 0 such that
f(x, y) + f(y, x) ≤ −τ ‖y − x‖2, ∀ x, y ∈ C. (3)
Strong monotonicity is exploited in those algorithms which are based on the reformula-
tion of (EP ) as a fixed point problem [30, 36, 42], while no known algorithm relies directly
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on the strict monotonicity of f . Both strict and strong monotonicity are rather restrictive
assumptions as each of them guarantees the uniqueness of the solution. Therefore, a few
algorithms rely on monotonicity: they belong to the classes of extragradient [40], prox-
imal point [15, 22, 32–35] and Tikhonov-Browder regularization methods [21, 23, 26].
Actually, many efforts have been devoted to further weaken the monotonicity require-
ments.
Definition 2.3 f is called pseudomonotone on C if
f(x, y) ≥ 0 =⇒ f(y, x) ≤ 0, ∀ x, y ∈ C. (4)
f is called weakly monotone on C if there exists τ > 0 such that
f(x, y) + f(y, x) ≤ τ ‖y − x‖2, ∀ x, y ∈ C. (5)
Pseudomonotonicity has been first used in the extragradient algorithms of [14] without
naming it so, but exploiting (4) for the points x which solve (EP ). Recently, other
extragradient algorithms have been developed exploiting the above definition [1, 38, 41].
Also fixed point [37] and so-called combined relaxation methods [19, 28, 46], which exploit
the standard fixed point iteration together with suitable projections, have been developed
relying on the pseudomonotonicity of f , as well as convex feasibility [16, 43] and proximal
point methods [2, 17, 20, 22, 29]. It is worth stressing that pseudomonotonicity is often
exploited to get the existence of a solution of the following equilibrium problem
find x∗ ∈ C s.t. f(y, x∗) ≤ 0, ∀ y ∈ C.
Actually, the convergence of some algorithms is achieved supposing directly the solv-
ability of this latter problem [20, 22, 38, 43]. Finally, weak monotonicity has been used
in proximal point algorithms only [17, 22, 29].
Regularization methods involve a sequence of equilibrium problems, which have to be
solved exploiting other techniques: for instance, descent methods have been exploited
in [21, 23, 26] within a regularization framework. Descent methods rely on the reformu-
lation of an equilibrium problem as an optimization problem. Since the objective function
is generally nonconvex, appropriate monotonicity conditions are needed to solve them.
Definition 2.4 f is called ∇-monotone on C if
〈∇xf(x, y) +∇yf(x, y), y − x〉 ≥ 0, ∀ x, y ∈ C. (6)
f is called strictly ∇-monotone on C if
〈∇xf(x, y) +∇yf(x, y), y − x〉 > 0, ∀ x, y ∈ C, x 6= y. (7)
f is called strongly ∇-monotone on C if there exists τ > 0 such that
〈∇xf(x, y) +∇yf(x, y), y − x〉 ≥ τ ‖y − x‖2, ∀ x, y ∈ C. (8)
Both strict and strong ∇-monotonicity guarantee that all the stationary points of the
reformulations as constrained optimization problems through gap functions are global
minima and hence solutions of the equilibrium problem (see [3–5, 31]). Therefore, these
conditions have been widely exploited to devise specific descent methods for (EP ): al-
gorithms for the latter case have been provided in [10, 24, 27, 31], while algorithms for
the former in [5, 12, 31]. On the contrary, ∇-monotonicity does not guarantee the above
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“stationarity property” (see [3]), and no algorithm is yet available for this case. Anyway,
when this property is not satisfied, some algorithms have been developed relying on the
following condition [3, 4].
Definition 2.5 f is called c-monotone on C if
f(x, y) + 〈∇xf(x, y), y − x〉 ≥ 0, ∀ x, y ∈ C. (9)
If f(·, y) is concave for all y ∈ C, then (9) holds. As a consequence, it is often referred
to as a concavity-type condition.
Yet another kind of monotonicity comes into play when reformulations of (EP ) as
unconstrained optimization problems through D-gap functions are exploited to devise
descent algorithms.
Definition 2.6 f is called ∇xy-monotone on C if the mapping ∇xf(x, ·) is monotone on
C for any x ∈ C, that is
〈∇xf(x, y)−∇xf(x, z), y − z〉 ≥ 0, ∀ x, y, z ∈ C. (10)
f is called strictly ∇xy-monotone on C if the mapping ∇xf(x, ·) is strictly monotone on
C for any x ∈ C, that is
〈∇xf(x, y)−∇xf(x, z), y − z〉 > 0, ∀ x, y, z ∈ C, y 6= z. (11)
f is called strongly ∇xy-monotone on C if the mappings ∇xf(x, ·) are strongly monotone
on C uniformly with respect to x ∈ C, that is, there exists τ > 0 such that
〈∇xf(x, y)−∇xf(x, z), y − z〉 ≥ τ ‖y − z‖2, ∀ x, y, z ∈ C. (12)
Both strict and strong ∇xy-monotonicity guarantee that all the stationary points of a
D-gap function are global minima and hence solutions of the equilibrium problem [47].
Specific descent methods have been developed exploiting both the former [48, 49] and
the latter condition [11, 25, 48], while ∇xy-monotonicity, which does not guarantee the
above property, has been exploited up to now only in [6].
3. Relations between monotonicity conditions
The twelve monotonicity conditions introduced in the previous section can be grouped
into 3 families: Definitions 2.2 and 2.3 provide the most well-known conditions, Defini-
tions 2.4 and 2.5 collect those conditions which are exploited by methods based on gap
functions, while Definition 2.6 brings together those conditions which are exploited by
methods based on D-gap functions. In the following they will be often referred to as the
first, the second and the third family, respectively.
Inside each family some relationships are straightforward, thus they are not discussed
explicitly. The following collection of results outlines some further non trivial relations
between the twelve conditions.
Theorem 3.1 Given any convex set C ⊆ Rn, the following statements hold:
a) if f is strongly ∇xy-monotone on C, then f is strongly ∇-monotone on C;
b) if f is strongly ∇xy-monotone on C, then f is strongly monotone on C;
c) if f is strictly ∇xy-monotone on C, then f is strictly ∇-monotone on C;
d) if f is strictly ∇xy-monotone on C, then f is strictly monotone on C;
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e) if f is ∇xy-monotone on C, then f is c-monotone on C;
f) if f is ∇xy-monotone on C, then f is monotone on C;
g) if f is c-monotone on C, then f is ∇-monotone on C.
Proof.
a) Since f(x, ·) is convex for any x ∈ C, the mapping ∇yf(x, ·) is monotone on C.
Therefore, the strong monotonicity of ∇xf(x, ·) implies
〈∇xf(x, y) +∇yf(x, y)−∇xf(x, x)−∇yf(x, x), y − x〉 ≥ τ ‖y − x‖2
for all x, y ∈ C, i.e., the mapping ∇xf(x, ·) +∇yf(x, ·) is strongly monotone on C.
On the other hand, ∇xf(x, x) +∇yf(x, x) = 0 since f(x, x) = 0 holds for all x ∈ C.
Thus,
〈∇xf(x, y) +∇yf(x, y), y − x〉 ≥ τ ‖y − x‖2, ∀ x, y ∈ C,
i.e., f is strongly ∇-monotone.
b) Given any x, y ∈ C, consider the function
g(t) := f(x+ t(y − x), x)− f(x+ t(y − x), y)
for t ∈ [0, 1]. Since f is continuously differentiable, g has a derivative and
g′(t) = [∇xf(x+ t(y − x), x)−∇xf(x+ t(y − x), y)] (y − x) ≤ −τ ‖y − x‖2
for all t ∈ [0, 1], where the inequality follows form the strong ∇xy-monotonicity of f .
Therefore,
g(1)− g(0) =
∫ 1
0
g′(t)dt ≤ −τ ‖y − x‖2,
while also
g(1)− g(0) = f(y, x)− f(y, y)− f(x, x) + f(x, y) = f(x, y) + f(y, x).
Thus, f is strongly monotone.
c) The proof is analogous to a).
d) The proof is analogous to b).
e) Given any x, y ∈ C, the ∇xy-monotonicity of f guarantees
〈∇xf(x, y)−∇xf(x, x), y − x〉 ≥ 0.
Moreover, ∇xf(x, x) +∇yf(x, x) = 0 since f(x, x) = 0 holds for any x ∈ C, while
f(x, y) ≥ f(x, x) + 〈∇yf(x, x), y − x〉 = 〈∇yf(x, x), y − x〉
follows from the convexity of the function f(x, ·). As a consequence,
f(x, y) + 〈∇xf(x, y), y − x〉 ≥ f(x, y) + 〈∇xf(x, x), y − x〉
= f(x, y)− 〈∇yf(x, x), y − x〉 ≥ 0,
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Figure 1. Relationships between monotonicity conditions: the general case.
and therefore f is c-monotone.
f) The proof is similar to b).
g) (see also [3, Theorem 3.1]). Since f(x, ·) is convex, then
0 = f(x, x) ≥ f(x, y) + 〈∇yf(x, y), x− y〉
holds for any x, y ∈ C. The above inequality and the c-monotonicity of f guarantee
〈∇xf(x, y) +∇yf(x, y), y − x〉 =
= (f(x, y) + 〈∇xf(x, y), y − x〉)− (f(x, y) + 〈∇yf(x, y), x− y〉) ≥ 0,
and thus f is ∇–monotone.

Figure 1 depicts the relationships between the twelve monotonicity conditions. Note
that the monotonicity conditions of the third family, that is the family related to D-gap
functions, imply the corresponding conditions of the two other families.
The following counterexamples show that no further relation holds between the above
conditions. To begin with, the next example shows that no condition belonging to the
first family implies any condition of the other two families.
Example 3.2 Let C = R and f(x, y) = ex2(y2 − x2) + x(y − x). Then, f is strongly
monotone since
f(x, y) + f(y, x) = (ex
2 − ey2)(y2 − x2)− (y − x)2 ≤ −(y − x)2 ∀ x, y ∈ C,
but it is not ∇-monotone since
〈∇xf(x, y) +∇yf(x, y), y − x〉 = (y − x)2[2ex2(x2 + xy + 1) + 1],
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which is negative for x = 1 and y = −3.
Hence, f is strongly monotone, strictly monotone, monotone, pseudomonotone and
weakly monotone, but it does not satisfies any of the other seven conditions.
The following four examples show that only the obvious relationships hold between the
conditions of the first family.
Example 3.3 Let C = R and f(x, y) = x3(y − x). Since
f(x, y) + f(y, x) = (x3 − y3)(y − x) < 0, ∀ x, y ∈ R, x 6= y,
f is strictly monotone. On the other hand, it is not strongly monotone since
[f(x, y) + f(y, x)]/(y − x)2 = −(x2 + xy + y2)→ 0
if x→ 0 and y → 0.
Example 3.4 Let C = R and f(x, y) = x− y. Since
f(x, y) + f(y, x) = 0
holds for any x, y ∈ R, f is monotone but not strictly monotone. Furthermore, f is
∇xy-monotone since
∇xf(x, y)−∇xf(x, z) = 0
holds for any x, y, z ∈ R. Hence, it is also c-monotone and ∇-monotone. On the other
hand, it is not strictly ∇-monotone since
∇xf(x, y) +∇yf(x, y) = 0
holds for any x, y ∈ R. Hence, f is ∇xy-monotone, ∇-monotone, c-monotone, monotone,
pseudomonotone and weakly monotone, but it does not satisfies any of the other six
conditions.
Example 3.5 Let C = R and f(x, y) = (x2 + 1)(y − x). then, f is pseudomonotone since
f(x, y) ≥ 0 =⇒ y ≥ x =⇒ f(y, x) ≤ 0,
but it is not weakly monotone since
[f(x, y) + f(y, x)]/(y − x)2 = −(x+ y)→ +∞
if, for instance, x → −∞ and y = 0. As a consequence, it is not monotone, strictly and
strongly monotone as well.
Example 3.6 Let C = R and f(x, y) = −x2−xy+2y2. Then, f is weakly monotone since
f(x, y) + f(y, x) = (y − x)2,
but is not pseudomonotone since f(2,−1) = 0 and f(−1, 2) = 9. Furthermore, f is
c-monotone since
f(x, y) + 〈∇xf(x, y), y − x〉 = −x2 − xy + 2y2 + (−2x− y)(y − x) = (x− y)2 ≥ 0,
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and it is strongly ∇-monotone since
〈∇xf(x, y) +∇yf(x, y), y − x〉 = 3 (y − x)2.
Hence, f is strongly ∇-monotone, strictly ∇-monotone, ∇-monotone, c-monotone and
weakly monotone, but it does not satisfies any of the other seven conditions.
The following two examples, together with Example 3.6, show that no further relation
holds between the conditions of the second family and those of the other two families.
Example 3.7 Let C = R and f(x, y) = (y−x)4+x(y−x). Then, f is strongly∇-monotone
since
〈∇xf(x, y) +∇yf(x, y), y − x〉 = (y − x)2.
Thus, it is both strictly ∇-monotone and ∇-monotone as well. However, f is not weakly
monotone since
[f(x, y) + f(y, x)]/(y − x)2 = 2(y − x)2 − 1→ +∞
if, for instance, x = 0 and y → +∞.
Example 3.8 Let C = [0,+∞) and f(x, y) = (y − x)4 + 3(y4 − x4). The concavity-type
condition (9) reads
f(x, y) + 〈∇xf(x, y), y − x〉 = 6x (x3 + 2y3 − 3xy2).
If x = 0 and y ∈ C then the above right-hand side is 0. On the other hand, if x > 0 and
y ∈ C, then there exists α ≥ 0 such that y = αx so that
f(x, y) + 〈∇xf(x, y), y − x〉 = 6x4(2α3 − 3α2 + 1)
which is non-negative since 2α3 − 3α2 + 1 ≥ 0 for all α ≥ 0. Therefore, f is c-monotone.
However, f is not weakly monotone since
[f(x, y) + f(y, x)]/(y − x)2 = 2(y − x)2 → +∞
if, for instance, x = 0 and y → +∞.
The following counterexample, paired with Examples 3.4 and 3.8, shows that no further
relation holds between the conditions of the second family.
Example 3.9 Let C = R and f(x, y) = x2 − 3xy + 2y2. Then, f is strongly ∇-monotone
since
〈∇xf(x, y) +∇yf(x, y), y − x〉 = (y − x)2.
Thus, it is both strictly ∇-monotone and ∇-monotone as well. However, it is not c-
monotone since
f(x, y) + 〈∇xf(x, y), y − x〉 = x2 − 3xy + 2y2 + (2x− 3y)(y − x) = −(y − x)2 < 0
for any pair x, y ∈ C with x 6= y.
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Note that Example 3.4 shows also that no further relation involving ∇xy-monotonicity
holds beyond those provided by Theorem 3.1. The following example provides an analo-
gous result for strict ∇xy-monotonicity.
Example 3.10 Let C = R and f(x, y) = ex(y − x). Since
〈∇xf(x, y)−∇xf(x, z), y − z〉 = ex(y − z)2,
f is strictly ∇xy-monotone but not strongly ∇xy-monotone. Furthermore, f is neither
strongly ∇-monotone nor strongly monotone since
〈∇xf(x, y) +∇yf(x, y), y − x〉/(y − x)2 = ex → 0
if x→ −∞, and
[f(x, y) + f(y, x)]/(y − x)2 = (ex − ey)(y − x)/(y − x)2 → 0
if, for instance, y = x+ 1 and x→ −∞.
Table 1 summarizes all the relationships between the twelve monotonicity conditions.
4. Particular cases
In this section two particular cases of (EP ) are studied: variational inequalities and linear
equilibrium problems. In both cases some further relationships between monotonicity
conditions hold beyond those already given by Theorem 3.1.
4.1 Variational inequalities
Consider (EP ) with
f(x, y) = 〈F (x), y − x〉
for some continuously differentiable mapping F : Rn → Rn. Since the first family of
monotonicity conditions for f (Definitions 2.2 and 2.3) is built relying on the similarity
with variational inequalities, they obviously collapse to the corresponding monotonicity
conditions for F . Furthermore, the core formulas for the other two families read
〈∇xf(x, y) +∇yf(x, y), y − x〉 = f(x, y) + 〈∇xf(x, y), y − x〉 = 〈y − x,∇F (x)(y − x)〉,
and
〈∇xf(x, y)−∇xf(x, z), y − z〉 = 〈y − z,∇F (x)(y − z)〉.
Therefore, the monotonicity, c-monotonicity, ∇-monotonicity and ∇xy-monotonicity of f
coincide with the monotonicity of F (see [45, Proposition 12.3]). The analogous equiva-
lences hold also for strong monotonicity conditions. On the contrary, the strict monotonic-
ity conditions are all different: strict ∇xy-monotonicity implies strict ∇-monotonicity,
which in turn implies strict monotonicity, while both the reverse implications do not
hold as shown by Example 3.3 for the latter and by the example below for the former.
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Figure 2. Relationships between monotonicity conditions: variational inequalities.
Example 4.1 Let C = R2+ and F (x1, x2) = (x1 + x2 + x21, x1 + x2 + x22). The matrix
∇F (x) =
(
1 + 2x1 1
1 1 + 2x2
)
is positive definite for any x 6= 0. Thus, if x 6= 0, then the inequality
〈y − x,∇F (x)(y − x)〉 > 0
holds for any x, y ∈ C satisfying y 6= x. Moreover, x = 0 implies
〈y − x,∇F (x)(y − x)〉 = 〈y,∇F (0)y〉 = (y1 + y2)2 > 0
for any y ∈ C with y 6= x. Therefore, f is strictly ∇-monotone. On the contrary, f is not
strictly ∇xy-monotone since x = 0, y = (1, 0) and z = (0, 1) provide
〈y − z,∇F (x)(y − z)〉 = 0.
Figure 2 shows how the twelve monotonicity conditions collapse to seven in the case
of variational inequalities.
Furthermore, (EP ) itself can be turned into a variational inequality (see [9, 18, 19, 44]).
In fact, x∗ ∈ C solves (EP ) if and only if it satisfies
〈G(x∗), y − x∗〉 ≥ 0, ∀ y ∈ C,
where G(x) := ∇yf(x, x). The relations between the monotonicity conditions of f and
G are reported in the following theorems.
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Theorem 4.2 [18, Proposition 2.1.17] Given any convex set C ⊆ Rn, the following
statements hold:
a) if f is strongly monotone on C, then G is strongly monotone on C;
b) if f is strictly monotone on C, then G is strictly monotone on C;
c) if f is monotone on C, then G is monotone on C;
d) if f is weakly monotone on C, then G is weakly monotone on C;
e) if f is pseudomonotone on C, then G is pseudomonotone on C.
Proof.
a)–d) Since f(z, ·) is convex for any z ∈ C, the inequalities
f(x, y) ≥ f(x, x) + 〈∇yf(x, x), y − x〉 = 〈G(x), y − x〉, (13)
f(y, x) ≥ f(y, y) + 〈∇yf(y, y), x− y〉 = 〈G(y), x− y〉, (14)
hold for any x, y ∈ C. Summing them,
〈G(y)−G(x), y − x〉 ≥ −f(x, y)− f(y, x)
follows. Therefore, the monotonicity of f implies the monotonicity of G and the same
implication works also for the strong, strict and weak cases.
e) If 〈G(x), y − x〉 ≥ 0, then (13) guarantees f(x, y) ≥ 0, and therefore the pseudomono-
tonicity of f implies f(y, x) ≤ 0, which together with (14) provides 〈G(y), x− y〉 ≤ 0.

None of the reverse implications holds: in Example 3.7 the bifunction f is neither
weakly monotone nor pseudomonotone, while the mapping G is strongly monotone (in-
deed G(x) = x).
Theorem 4.3 Suppose that f is twice continuously differentiable. Given any convex set
C ⊆ Rn, then
a) if f is strongly ∇-monotone on C, then G is strongly monotone on C;
b) if f is ∇-monotone on C, then G is monotone on C.
Proof.
a) Given any x, y ∈ C, consider the function
h(t) := 〈∇xf(x, xt) +∇yf(x, xt), y − x〉,
where xt := x+t (y−x) and t ∈ [0, 1]. Since f(z, z) = 0 for all z ∈ C, then ∇xf(x, x)+
∇yf(x, x) = 0, that is h(0) = 0. Furthermore, any t ∈ (0, 1] satisfies
[h(t)− h(0)]/t = 〈∇xf(x, xt) +∇yf(x, xt), xt − x〉/t2
≥ τ ‖xt − x‖2/t2
= τ ‖y − x‖2,
where the inequality follows from the strong ∇-monotonicity of f . Taking the limit as
t ↓ 0, then h′(0) ≥ τ ‖y − x‖2. On the other hand,
h′(0) = 〈y − x, [∇2xyf(x, x) +∇2yyf(x, x)](y − x)〉 = 〈y − x,∇G(x)(y − x)〉.
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Therefore, G is strongly monotone.
b) The proof is analogous to a).

Both the reverse implications do not hold: in Example 3.2 the bifunction f is not
∇-monotone, while the mapping G is strongly monotone (indeed G(x) = 2xex2 + x).
Notice that the above proof does not work in the strictly monotone case since it involves
a limit. Whether or not the strict ∇-monotonicity of f implies the strict monotonicity
of G remains an open question.
4.2 Linear equilibrium problems
Consider the so-called linear equilibrium problem [42], that is (EP ) with
f(x, y) = 〈Px+Qy + r, y − x〉 (15)
for some r ∈ Rn and some P,Q ∈ Rn×n, where Q is positive semidefinite (in order to
guarantee that f(x, ·) is convex). In this case the core formulas read
〈∇xf(x, y)−∇xf(x, z), y − z〉 = 〈y − z, (P T −Q)(y − z)〉 = 〈y − z, (P −Q)(y − z)〉,
f(x, y) + f(y, x) = −〈y − x, (P −Q)(y − x)〉,
f(x, y) + 〈∇xf(x, y), y − x〉 = 〈y − x, P (y − x)〉,
and
〈∇xf(x, y) +∇yf(x, y), y − x〉 = 〈y − x, (P +Q)(y − x)〉.
Hence, f is monotone and ∇xy-monotone if the matrix P − Q is positive semidefinite
(shortly, psd), it is c-monotone if P is psd and ∇-monotone if P +Q is psd.
Note that monotonicity coincides with ∇xy-monotonicity, but they are not equiva-
lent to either c-monotonicity or ∇-monotonicity as it happens in the case of variational
inequalities. Analogous relations hold also for strong and strict monotonicity condi-
tions. Furthermore, strong ∇xy-monotonicity (∇-monotonicity) is equivalent to strict
∇xy-monotonicity (∇-monotonicity). Finally, weak monotonicity is always satisfied with
τ = ‖P −Q‖, but it is not equivalent to pseudomonotonicity (see Example 3.6).
Figure 3 shows how the twelve monotonicity conditions collapse to seven in the case
of linear equilibrium problems.
Nash equilibrium problems in noncooperative games with quadratic cost functions are
an interesting particular case of linear equilibrium problems: each player i has a set of
feasible strategies Ki ⊆ Rni and aims at minimizing a quadratic cost function which
depends also on the strategies of the other players, namely
ci(x) =
1
2
〈xi, Aiixi〉+
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
〈xi, Aijxj〉+ 〈bi, xi〉,
12
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∇xy-monotone
(P-Q pd)
strictly
∇xy-monotone
(P-Q pd)
∇xy-monotone
(P-Q psd)
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∇-monotone
(P+Q pd)
strictly
∇-monotone
(P+Q pd)
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(P+Q psd)
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(P-Q psd)
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(P-Q pd)
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monotone
(P-Q pd)
weakly
monotone
Figure 3. Relationships between monotonicity conditions: linear equilibria.
where N denotes the number of players, x ∈ K1 × · · · × KN and the squared matri-
ces A11, . . . , ANN are symmetric and positive semidefinite. Finding a Nash equilibrium
amounts to solving (EP ) with C = K1 × · · · × KN and the Nikaido-Isoda aggregate
bifunction
f(x, y) =
N∑
i=1
[ci(x)− ci(x(yi))]
where x(yi) denotes the vector obtained from x replacing xi by yi [39]. This bifunction
can be written in the form (15) just setting
P =

A11/2 A12 . . . A1N
A21 A22/2 . . . A2N
...
...
. . .
...
AN1 AN2 . . . ANN/2
 , Q =

A11/2 0 . . . 0
0 A22/2
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . . 0
0 . . . 0 ANN/2
 , (16)
and r = (b1, . . . , bN )
T . Hence, it is monotone if Aij = −ATji for any i, j = 1, . . . , N ; it is
c-monotone if the matrix P in (16) is psd and ∇-monotone if the block matrix A = (Aij)
is psd.
5. Conclusions
Twelve monotonicity conditions, which are relevant in the algorithms for (EP ), have
been analysed. They include the most widespread definitions of monotonicity and some
further conditions, which have been introduced in order to guarantee the convergence of
descent methods based on gap or D-gap functions. All the relations between the twelve
conditions have been identified.
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Furthermore, two particular cases have been examined: variational inequalities and
linear equilibrium problems. In both cases the twelve kinds of monotonicity collapse to
seven different conditions. Anyway, the additional relationships are not all the same in
the two cases: indeed, just two are common to both, while the other four of the first case
are different from the other six of the second case.
Finally, it is worth stressing that almost all the algorithms for (EP ) involve some
further assumptions in addition to monotonicity. Thus, the relationships between mono-
tonicity conditions are very useful to compare convergence results, but alone they are
not enough to make full comparisons.
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Table 1. Relationships between monotonicity conditions.
=⇒ strongly strictly pseudo weakly strongly strictly strongly strictly
monotone monotone monotone monotone monotone ∇-monotone ∇-monotone ∇-monotone c-monotone ∇xy-monotone ∇xy-monotone ∇xy-monotone
strongly – yes yes yes yes no no no no no no no
monotone (Ex. 3.2) (Ex. 3.2) (Ex. 3.2) (Ex. 3.2) (Ex. 3.2) (Ex. 3.2) (Ex. 3.2)
strictly no – yes yes yes no no no no no no no
monotone (Ex. 3.3) (Ex. 3.2) (Ex. 3.2) (Ex. 3.2) (Ex. 3.2) (Ex. 3.2) (Ex. 3.2) (Ex. 3.2)
no no – yes yes no no no no no no no
monotone (Ex. 3.4) (Ex. 3.4) (Ex. 3.2) (Ex. 3.2) (Ex. 3.2) (Ex. 3.2) (Ex. 3.2) (Ex. 3.2) (Ex. 3.2)
no no no – no no no no no no no no
pseudomonotone (Ex. 3.5) (Ex. 3.5) (Ex. 3.5) (Ex. 3.5) (Ex. 3.2) (Ex. 3.2) (Ex. 3.2) (Ex. 3.2) (Ex. 3.2) (Ex. 3.2) (Ex. 3.2)
weakly no no no no – no no no no no no no
monotone (Ex. 3.6) (Ex. 3.6) (Ex. 3.6) (Ex. 3.6) (Ex. 3.2) (Ex. 3.2) (Ex. 3.2) (Ex. 3.2) (Ex. 3.2) (Ex. 3.2) (Ex. 3.2)
strongly no no no no no – yes yes no no no no
∇-monotone (Ex. 3.6) (Ex. 3.6) (Ex. 3.6) (Ex. 3.6) (Ex. 3.7) (Ex. 3.9) (Ex. 3.6) (Ex. 3.6) (Ex. 3.6)
strictly no no no no no no – yes no no no no
∇-monotone (Ex. 3.6) (Ex. 3.6) (Ex. 3.6) (Ex. 3.6) (Ex. 3.7) (Ex. 3.8) (Ex. 3.9) (Ex. 3.6) (Ex. 3.6) (Ex. 3.6)
no no no no no no no – no no no no
∇-monotone (Ex. 3.6) (Ex. 3.6) (Ex. 3.6) (Ex. 3.6) (Ex. 3.7) (Ex. 3.8) (Ex. 3.4) (Ex. 3.9) (Ex. 3.6) (Ex. 3.6) (Ex. 3.6)
no no no no no no no yes – no no no
c-monotone (Ex. 3.6) (Ex. 3.6) (Ex. 3.6) (Ex. 3.6) (Ex. 3.8) (Ex. 3.8) (Ex. 3.4) (Ex. 3.6) (Ex. 3.6) (Ex. 3.6)
strongly yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes – yes yes
∇xy-monotone
strictly no yes yes yes yes no yes yes yes no – yes
∇xy-monotone (Ex 3.10) (Ex. 3.10) (Ex. 3.10)
no no yes yes yes no no yes yes no no –
∇xy-monotone (Ex 3.4) (Ex 3.4) (Ex. 3.4) (Ex. 3.4) (Ex. 3.4) (Ex. 3.4)
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